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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  Background to the study  
Effective and efficient local government is widely recognized as essential to the economic, 
social, and cultural well-being of a community.
1
 Local government is an important channel 
for delivering services that are connected with the alleviation of poverty and community 
development.
2
 For instance, local government‟s delivery of essential physical infrastructure 
such as roads, recreational parks or social services such as education, housing, refuse removal 
and water affects the quality of people‟s lives. The services provided by local government 
also play an important part in establishing relations of accountability between government 
and communities. 
Local governments confront varied challenges which inhibit their ability to provide services 
effectively and efficiently.
3
 One obstacle is uncertainty about the legal framework under 
which local government operate, in particular the status, powers and functions of local 
government in the state. The absence of an effective and certain legislative framework for 
local government is an obstacle to service delivery.
4
 Typical problems with the legislative 
framework include centralised bureaucratic or political control over local government by 
higher levels of government, limited revenue raising powers, and a lack of clarity on the 
responsibilities of local government. Local government in Zimbabwe is no exception to these 
challenges facing local government across the world. This paper examines four main 
weaknesses in the design of the legislative framework regulating urban councils (hereafter 
UCs). First, UCs lack constitutional protection. This means that UCs operate under a 
framework defined by the Urban Councils Act (hereafter UC Act).
5
 This legislative 
framework of UCs is subject to central government discretionary powers of regulation. 
Secondly, the UC Act vests unfettered powers in the minister responsible for local 
government,
6
 who can intervene in a wide range of operations of ULG. UCs can also only 
                                                          
1
 Mushamba S „The powers and functions of local government‟ in De Visser J et al (eds.) Local government 
reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue (2010) 101(hereafter   A policy dialogue). 
2
 Andrews M & Shah A „Assessing local Government in developing countries‟ in Shah (ed.)  Public sector 
governance and accountability series: Public service delivery (2005) 63 (hereafter Andrews M and Shah A). 
3
 De Vries MS et al (eds.) Improving local government: Outcomes of comparative research (2008) 1. 
4
 Mushamba S A policy dialogue (2010) 113. 
5
 Act No 25 of 1996 
6
 Minister of Local Government Rural and Urban Development (hereafter  minister). 
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exercise their powers subject to approval by the minister. Thirdly, UCs lack fiscal autonomy 
to generate revenue as the same is controlled by the minister. Lastly, UCs lack the autonomy 
and independence to recruit own senior personnel. The recruitment of senior personnel is the 
responsibility of the local government board appointed by the minister (hereafter LGB). In 
most cases, the appointment of senior officials is not based on competency but partisan 
loyalty. For instance, it is alleged that the recruitment of the current senior officials of UCS 
like Mutare and Chinhoyi City Council among other local authorities was appointed on 
partisan loyalty as opposed to competence of officials.  
This study examines the impact of these weaknesses in the legislation on the provision of 
basic services such as water supply, sanitation, primary health, and education. The argument 
advanced is that service delivery by UCs has been undermined due to a highly centralized 
bureaucracy and a legal framework that fails to protect and guarantee the powers of UCs.   
2. Statement of the problem  
This study focuses on the impact on service provision arising from uncertainties in the UC 
Act. There are serious problems with the delivery of basic services in urban areas: including 
frequent interruptions in water supply, persistent power cuts, uncollected refuse, poor health 
services and dilapidated infrastructure. The purpose of this study is to highlight specific 
weaknesses in the UC Act and examine how these contribute to poor service delivery.  The 
specific weaknesses to be examined are the unfettered powers of the minister, lack of legal 
certainty on powers and functions of UCs, limited revenue generating powers and lack of 
autonomy in recruiting senior council administration. First, UCs exercise delegated powers 
from central government. The minister has powers to give directions on matters of policy, 
suspend, reverse, or rescind council resolutions. There is no legal authority to check and 
balance the unfettered powers of the minister. Poor service delivery may be attributed in part 
to the unfettered powers of the minister. Secondly, UCs do not have devolved fiscal powers. 
As agents of central government, UCs can only levy those taxes and borrow money as 
authorised by the minister. The limited capacities of UCs to generate own revenue impacts 
negatively on the capacity of UCs to respond to the needs of the communities they serve. 
Thirdly, the powers UCs exercise are not constitutionally protected and guaranteed. Central 
government can revoke the powers conferred on UCs. The lack of constitutional protection of  
their powers has the potential to inhibit the ability of UCs to function effectively in the 
provision of services. Lastly, UCs do not have autonomy and authority to recruit their own 
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senior staff; their authority is limited to formal appointment only. A local government board, 
appointed by the Minister is responsible for the recruitment of senior council staff. The chain 
of authority from the Minister to the LGB may potentially compromise the appointment of 
staff on the basis of merit by promoting patronage, especially in politically charged 
situations. The appointment of officials on the basis of political loyalty rather than on merit 
can compromise service delivery. 
These four problems are due in part to problems with the design of the legislative framework 
for UCs. This study examines each of these weaknesses, their impact on service delivery, and 
recommends reforms to the UC Act in order to enhance service delivery? 
3. Significance and Objective of the research 
There is substantial literature on the design of the UC Act.  This study addresses a gap in the 
literature, namely the linkage between weaknesses in the UC Act and poor service delivery. 
4. Literature review  
It is often said that local government is the level of government closest to the people because 
local government provides basic services that contribute to the well-being of individuals and 
communities.
7
 Local government can be described as a „set of recognized democratically 
elected institutions, lawfully created to offer a variety of quantified services to comparatively 
small geographic areas‟.8 Academics generally agree that an effective regulatory framework 
is necessary to provide local government with sufficient powers, protect its autonomy, and 
enhance its capacities and administration.
9
 For instance, Muia argues that an appropriate 
legislative framework is necessary to ensure well-defined and clearly demarcated functions of 
local and higher levels of government.
10
 A well regulated environment protects the powers 
and independence of local government from interference by higher levels of government.  De 
Visser also supports that view:  
                                                          
7
 Council of Europe European Charter of local self-government adopted on 15 October 1995 and entered into 
force on 1 September 1988 available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/congress/sessions/18/Source/CharteEuropeenne_en.pdf  (accessed 3 November 2011) 
(hereafter European charter). 
8
 Bratton M Citizen perceptions of local government responsiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa (2011) 2 (hereafter 
Bratton M). 
9
 Chatiza K „Can local government steer socio-economic transformation in Zimbabwe?‟ in De Visser J et al 
(eds.) Local government reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue (2010) 22 (hereafter A policy dialogue). 
10
 Muia DM „Devolution: Which way for local authorities‟ in  Kibua TN and Mwabu G (eds.) Decentralisation 
and devolution in Kenya: New approaches (2008) 163 (hereafter Kibua TN and Mwabu G). 
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„If local government does not have sufficient and real powers, it cannot enlarge people‟s 
choice by being responsive to their needs (and thereby improve their well-being). Instead, it is 
constrained in having to work within a limited mandate without room for initiative‟.11 
The literature emphasises the importance of guaranteeing the operational framework of ULG 
with adequate regulatory legal systems that augment their abilities and autonomy. 
 In the context of Zimbabwe, there is disagreement amongst scholars about the adequacy of 
the legal framework that governs ULG. One school of thought views the legislative 
framework as adequate. Chakaipa argues that there is an effective legal framework that 
operationalises ULG.
12
 Mushamba attributes poor service delivery to poor performance, „the 
law is very clear as to what the UCs are mandated to do...performance often lags behind the 
legislated intentions‟.13 The other school of thought is that legislative reform is essential for 
local government to be able to provide services efficiently and effectively. For example, 
Chatiza argues that while other factors contribute to the decline in the capacities of UCs, „one 
cannot deny that some of the problems that local government grapples with in Zimbabwe 
could be addressed through careful and far reaching legal reforms‟.14 There is evidence to 
suggest that many civil society bodies such as residents associations, civil society groups, 
research institutions and major political formations believe that the „legislation is written in a 
manner that renders it open to abuse‟ since it gives the minister excessive powers.15  
The literature on the UC Act identifies some of the weaknesses, but the link between the 
weaknesses in the UC Act and poor service delivery is a gap in the literature. This study 
examines in particular the impact of unfettered powers of the minister, lack of clarity on 
powers, a lack of autonomy to recruit senior administration and limited revenue raising 
powers. 
5. Research Methodology  
The research is based on documentary research. First, both print and electronic media were 
utilised in carrying out this study. Newspapers used include The Herald and The Newsday. 
Views expressed in these newspaper articles were taken to represent the perspectives of the 
person quoted in them especially for those whom the writer had no access to. Secondly, 
authoritative texts were used extensively in order to gain sight into the jurisprudence of ULG. 
                                                          
11
 De Visser J Developmental local government: A case study of South Africa (2005) 35 (hereafter De Visser J). 
12
 Chakaipa S A policy dialogue (2010) 32. 
13
 Mushamba S A policy dialogue (2010) 109. 
14
 Chatiza K  A policy dialogue (2010) 22. 
15
 Mushamba S A policy dialogue (2010) 119. 
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Lastly, the internet was extensively used in giving a comparative analysis with other 
jurisdictions and for researching international standards in regards to ULG institutions.  
 
6. Structure of the study 
The study consists of five chapters: 
Chapter 1 provides a background to the study and outlines the problem statement, objectives 
and focus of the study, and the main arguments.   
Chapter 2 examines the international literature on ULG and service delivery. The chapter 
discusses the importance attached to both ULG and service delivery in the international 
literature and identifies the key features for effective urban local government and service 
delivery. 
Chapter 3 provides a brief historical background to the development of urban local 
government in Zimbabwe and describes the legal framework for UCs, focusing on those 
provisions that provide for the powers and function of urban councils, central government 
regulation, revenue raising powers, and the administration of council, to the extent of its link 
with service provision. 
Chapter 4 analyses the inadequacies in the UC Act that inhibit service provision, drawing on 
the international normative framework on ULG and service delivery described in chapter 2. 
The analysis focuses on the unfettered powers of the minister, the powers of UCs, fiscal 
generating powers and the lack of UCs‟ autonomy in the hiring of UCs staff as the 
weaknesses in the UC Act which restrict service provision.  
Chapter 5 synthesizes the findings from the analysis in the previous chapters and 
recommends ways to correct the legislative weaknesses in the UC Act for an effective and 
efficient provision of services. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
URBAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY 
 
1. Introduction 
Urban local government plays a pivotal role in providing services that enhance the well-being 
of urban citizens and development.
16
 These basic services include refuse and sewage 
disposal, water supply, primary health and education. This chapter examines the essential 
elements of the institutional framework for effective and efficient provision of services by 
ULG.  
This chapter argues, although there is no universal model for ULG, the literature on ULG and 
service delivery suggests particular common institutional elements for effective ULG.
17
 The 
key elements the chapter focuses on are: democratically constituted ULG, administrative 
autonomy, well-defined and legally protected powers, adequate fiscal powers to sustain ULG 
functions and supervision from higher levels of government.  
2. ULG and service delivery 
Local government is referred to as government which does not have an order of government 
between it and the community it serves.
18
 ULG are lower level units whose geographical 
demarcation encompasses urban areas.
19
 These lower level units are variously referred to as 
cities, towns, cantons, boards, boroughs or municipalities, among others. The status, powers 
and functions of ULG will differ from country to country. The primary purpose of ULG is the 
delivery of a wide range of services that are financially supported from a variety of revenue 
sources.
20
  
 
                                                          
16
 Bhuiyan SH „A crisis in governance: Urban solid waste management in Bangladesh‟ (2010) 34 Habitat 
International125-133 125 (hereafter Bhuiyan SH). 
17
 De Vries M (2008) 171. 
18
 Steytler N „Comparative Conclusions‟ in Steytler N (ed.) Local government and metropolitan regions in 
federal systems: A global dialogue of federalism (2009) 4. 
19
 UN-Habitat Quick  guide for policy makers  housing the poor in African cities  Local government: Addressing 
urban challenges in a participatory and integrated way  Available at 
http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/searchResults.aspx?sort=relevance&page=search&searchField=all&searchstri
ng=local+government&x=18&y=11 (accessed 27 October 2011)(hereafter UN-Habitat Quick guide for Policy 
Makers). 
20
 UN-Habitat Quick guide for policy makers. 
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ULG plays a significant role in providing services such as primary health care, housing, 
public transportation, education, effluent and refuse removal that contribute to the standards 
of living of urban populations.
21
 There are however major problems with urban service 
provision. In developing countries, ULG often either provides poor quality services or fail to 
meet citizens‟ needs of access to basic services.22 Shah draws the link between effective 
service provision and fighting poverty: 
„[a]ll municipalities in the developing world play a major role in providing services that are critical for 
the poor, but that “The critical role of basic services in reducing poverty is often forgotten or 
dismissed”... and have drawn a stance of limited responsiveness‟.23 
It is widely acknowledged that the provision of safe drinking water, inadequate sanitation and 
housing, poor health services and waste pollution has created unhealthy and unsafe 
environments for urban populations and reduced the quality of human life.
24
 The poor and 
vulnerable in towns and cities suffer the worst effects of poor service delivery.25 
 
Rapid urbanisation has also increased the pressure on ULGs. Urban areas constitute almost 
2.8 per cent of the earth‟s surface.26 Urban population in African urban areas is growing at 
about 3.3 per cent a year.
27
 It is estimated that by 2050 the population of developing countries 
alone will be approximately 5.3 billion due to urban growth and rural to urban migration.
28
 
This growth in urban populations requires the „re-evaluation of the economic significance of 
cities and the reaffirmation of the significance of local institution building for 
development‟.29 Rapid urban growth in developing countries is having a serious impact on 
the capacity of ULG to provide basic services to growing populations. The „urban reality in 
                                                          
21
 Stewart J (1983) 2. 
22
 Andrews M and Shah A (2005) 75. 
23
 Andrews M and Shah A (2005) 74. 
24
 Bhuiyan SH (2010) 34. 
25
 For example in developing countries across the world, the number of urban residents without access to tap 
water in their home or within proximity has increased by „an estimated 114 million, and the number of those 
who lack access to the most basic sanitation facilities has risen by 134 million. This 20 per cent increase has had 
a hugely detrimental impact on human health and on economic productivity: people are sick and unable to work‟ 
for these statistics see the UN-Habitat final report „Water for cities: responding to urban challenges‟ Water and 
urbanisation World water day (2011) available at 
http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/searchResults.aspx?sort=relevance&page=search&searchField=all&searchstri
ng=urban+government&x=23&y=5 (accessed 3 November 2011) (hereafter water and urbanisation). 
26
 UN-Habitat Urban world cities and land rights (2011) 5(hereafter Urban World Cities). 
27
 This is the combined outcome of an overall population growth rate of 2.2 per cent a year and an urbanisation 
rate of 1.1 percent a year for these statistics see McGranahan G et al „Africa‟s urban transition and the role of 
regional urbanisation‟ Human settlements working paper series theme: Urban change 5 (2009)  
http://pubs.iied.org/10571IIED.html (accessed 23 November 2011). 
28
UN-Habitat Urban world cities (2011) 6. 
29
 Strein R „Urban management‟ in development assistance: An elusive concept  (1992) 10 Elsevier Ltd 125-138 
130. 
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much of Africa is that millions of people do not benefit from services due to ineffective urban 
local governments‟.30 As a result, large urban populations live in abject poverty with no or 
poor access to basic services, even as urbanization is creating a greater demand for basic 
public services.
31
 ULG are expected to adopt a legislative framework that enhances and 
guarantees feasible provision of basic urban services in urban areas.    
3. International perspective on urban service provision 
In urban areas, effective ULG is essential to provide basic services to urban populations. The 
centrality of effective and efficient urban service provision was emphasised in the 2009 
International guidelines on decentralisation and access to basic service:  
„Basic services contribute to human dignity, quality of life, sustainable livelihoods and the enjoyment 
of human rights. They are a prerequisite for the provision of other services and for the improvement of 
the potential of each person to engage in economic activity. Basic services must, therefore, be 
available, accessible, culturally acceptable, and affordable, of good quality and provided on a non-
discriminatory basis‟.32  
Most importantly are the actions of ULG institutions to deliver services in ways that are 
responsive to the needs and expectations of urban residents. There is a general consensus 
amongst literature on ULG that if one or more of these values is present: efficient service 
delivery, a fair and effective legal framework, participation, equity, responsiveness to civil 
society, accountability, inclusion, transparency, security, decentralisation, and sustainability 
then ULG would be considered efficient and effective.
33
  
 
Literature on ULG does not provide a universal accepted definition of service delivery. 
Harpham and Boateng offer the following definition: 
„Service provision is when the organisation or institution involved is responsible for the quality and 
quantity of the services and ensures that it is financed and executed. Service production encompasses 
factors that go into delivering that service when the quantity and quality have been decided‟.34  
The provision of services requires two pre-conditions namely: efficiency and effectiveness.
 35
 
Shah defines efficiency and effectiveness in the following terms:  
                                                          
30
 Kessides C „The urban transition in Sub-Saharan Africa: challenges and opportunities‟ (2007) 25 
Environment and planning government and policy 466. 
31
 Bhuiyan SH (2010) 34. 
32
  UN- Habitat „International guidelines on decentralisation and access to basic services for all‟ (2009) available 
at http://www.fondation-igd.org/pdf/CSE/ASE_guiding.pdf  (accessed 27 October 2011). 
33
 UN- Habitat „International guidelines on decentralisation and access to basic services for all‟ (2009) available 
at http://www.fondation-igd.org/pdf/CSE/ASE_guiding.pdf  (accessed 27 October 2011). 
34
 Harpham T and Boateng KA (1997) 66. 
35
 Andrews M & Shah A (2005) 197. 
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„In the public service literature, efficiency is defined as the amount of output per unit of an input used 
in the process- for example, the number of road repairs per employee-days involved in the task. 
Effectiveness is the degree to which the outcomes achieve the goals set for the activity- for example, 
the percentage of roads maintained in good condition relative to policy goals‟.36   
While the elements of effective and efficient urban service delivery are clear, the 
effectiveness of ULG will be determined by circumstances in a particular country. The 
United Nations Development Fund for instance emphasises that „effective delivery is 
situation-specific and requires tailored delivery arrangements that fuse the efforts of state and 
non-state actors.‟37 These delivery arrangements should ensure that fiscal resources match 
with the service provision needs of urban communities to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness. Countries should through an appropriate legislative framework create an 
environment that facilitates effective and efficient service provision in ULG.    
 4. The institutional elements of effective and efficient urban local government  
The literature on ULG identifies democratic ULG, administrative autonomy, fiscal generating 
powers, supervision and legally protected powers as essential elements of ULG. These 
elements are regarded as essential in ULG because they link in some way to effective and 
efficient service delivery. The chapter will discuss each of these essential elements and the 
crucial impact they have on the provision of services.
38
  
 
 4.1 Democratically Instituted decision-making bodies 
 
A link is often drawn in international literature between democracy and efficient and 
effective ULG. It is widely recognised that democratically instituted decision-making bodies 
are essential to the existence of ULG.
39
 Democratic ULG allows residents to realise their 
                                                          
36
 Andrews M & Shah A (2005) 197. 
37
 UNCDF Global forum on local development Pursuing the MDGs through local government available at 
http://www.uncdf.org/gfld/docs/session_2.pdf  (accessed 27 October 2011). 
38
 The purpose is to see whether or not in the UC Act confirms to these widely acknowledged essential 
elements. While ULG in Zimbabwe elects its councillors, the legislative environment created by the UC Act 
fails to embrace the importance of democratic local level institutions, for instance the UC Act empowers the 
minister to appoint special interest councillors in UCs, gives the minister unfettered powers over UCs decision-
making, limits UCs‟ capacity to generate revenue and interferes in the UCs‟ administration of UCs. The chapter 
argues that a democratically constituted ULG, fiscal generating powers, supervision, administrative autonomy 
and legally protected powers has more successes stories in the provision of services for efficient and effective 
ULG.  
39
 Stewart J (1983) 121. 
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expectations through representation by democratic and accountable entities, influencing 
decision-making processes through the ballot.
40
  
 
Elections are „central to urban local government because they legitimise the council‟s right to 
independent action and provide the basis for urban local accountability‟.41 An election also 
encourages societal involvement in urban governance. As recognised in the Preamble of the 
European Charter of Local Self Government, the involvement of citizens is a key element of 
democracy.
42
 Community involvement influences local choice. It provides urban residents 
with a platform to contribute and take part in urban council‟s processes in between and 
during elections for accountability.
43
 Public participation by other societal actors such as the 
private sector and non- governmental actors has the potential to enhance service provision.
44
 
Bratton identifies the importance of citizen participation: 
„Democratic elections do not reliably guarantee that elected leaders will subsequently be more 
responsive to their constituents. A principal challenge in deepening democratic governance is to 
strengthen procedures for ensuring that representatives listen to the populace and respond to their needs 
between elections‟.45 
In order to strengthen democracy in ULG, countries should adopt regulatory mechanisms that 
facilitate accountability of politicians to the electorate. 
4.2 Revenue raising powers 
 
The literature on ULG identifies three distinct revenue generating sources namely local 
taxing
46
 and surcharges,
47
 borrowing and intergovernmental grants
48
 as an essential element 
                                                          
40
 Stewart J (1983) 121. 
41
 Stewart J (1983) 121.  
42
 Europe European Charter 1988. 
43
 De Visser J (2005) 38. 
44
 United Nations Conference on Human Settlement „The Istanbul declaration and the habitat agenda with 
subject index‟ http://www.un-habitat.org/downloads/docs/3570_62952_HS-441.pdf  accessed 27 October 2011. 
45
 Bratton M (2008) 16. 
46
 Types of local taxes: resource rent tax, royalties, fees, charges, severance taxes, production, output and 
property taxes. 
47
 A surcharge is an extra fee added onto another fee or charge on an existing tax.. 
48 Intergovernmental transfers can either be conditional or unconditional grants. Unconditional grants are meant 
to undertake fiscal responsibilities such as maintaining macro stability and tax competition. Conditional grants 
usually reflect „national efficiency and equity concerns, and where there is a financial penalty associated with 
failure to comply with any of the conditions. Thus conditions will not be on the specific use of grant funds but 
attainment of standards in quality, access and level of services. Such grants do not affect local government 
incentives for cost efficiency but do encourage compliance with nationally specified standards for access and 
level of services. Properly designed conditional non-matching transfers can create incentives for innovative and 
competitive approaches to improved service delivery‟ for this differentiation, see Shah A (2004) 26. 
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of ULG.
49
 In „Reforming governance in Dhaka, Bangladesh‟ Islam et al argue that local 
finance performs a „crucial role in determining the autonomy or dependence of local 
government on central government and thereby operational freedom‟.50 Keating concurs with 
the above argument and points out that local taxing and surcharges, borrowing and 
intergovernmental grants are critical fiscal revenue sources for ULG.
51
 Scholars such as Shah 
argue that properly designed intergovernmental transfers can improve innovative and 
economical approaches to enhanced delivery of service.
52
 Revenue generated by ULG 
enables effective and predictable provision of goods and services. In place should be a 
legislative framework that gives ULG autonomy to generate sufficient revenue.
53
  
 
The available literature on ULG shows that limited fiscal-raising powers constrain and limit 
the capacity and responsiveness of ULG.
54
 Fiscal autonomy and sufficient revenue is of 
critical importance for efficiency in the provision of service by ULG.
55
 In order to enhance 
the service delivery, ULG should have access to fiscal resources so that ULG is able to utilise 
its spending powers for efficiency.
56
 
 
ULG does not only require devolved fiscal powers, the fiscal sources also need to align as 
close as possible to ULG expenditure to ensure accountability.
57
 The requirement to make 
fiscal resource match with expenditure helps in promoting local ownership, oversight and 
interest over ULG service provision function. The expenditure of ULG is set out in a budget. 
ULG should operate within the confines of a budget, so that it does not expend excessively.
58
 
The World Bank, in its 2000 World Development Report, highlights the link between 
revenue powers and effective urban government: 
                                                          
49
 See for example Stewart J (1983), see also Kibua TN and Mwabu G (1991) and Keating M (1991).  
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The guiding principle of revenue assignment is straightforward: finance should follow function. This is 
so not only because resources must be commensurate with what they fund, but also because the type of 
revenues used affects consumer behaviour and results in different patterns of incidence‟.59  
A general trend can be deduced from the above literature; ULG should have legal certainty 
on the fiscal autonomy to generate sufficient revenue in particular powers to tax and impose 
surcharges, receive intergovernmental grants and borrow. The functions that require funding 
should be clear, so that ULG expends within its budget and proportionate to its revenue. 
4.3 Legally protected and well-defined powers 
The powers and structure of (urban) local governments should be defined in legislation.
60
 
Legal certainty enables ULGs to exercise their powers and functions.
61
 Legislation also 
protects the autonomy of ULG.
62
 A clear legislative framework should distinguish ULG role 
from higher levels of government.
63
 The regulatory framework should be designed to realise 
that urban local institutions are „sometimes agents of the central government and sometimes 
principals acting on their own‟.64  Kibua and Mwalibu argue that „Constitutions, laws and 
regulations codify the formal rules...by which a ULG system is supposed to function‟.65 The 
constitutions, laws and regulations should provide for the powers of ULG in a clear and 
definite manner that allows ULG to provide for services effectively and efficiently. 
4.4 Supervision of ULG 
The literature emphasises the importance of effective supervision of ULG by higher levels of 
government (such as central government and provinces). Higher levels of government should 
monitor ULG to ensure uniformity and excellence in the provision of services.
66
 For instance, 
regulation is important where ULG implements intergovernmental mandates.
67
 The purpose 
is to ensure that national goals, interests and values are upheld.
68
 In the same vein, mandates 
that are centrally funded necessitate implementation in line with central government 
guidelines where ULG exercises devolved powers.
69
 Regulation may also play a pivotal role 
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in protecting ULG from macro-economic instability.
70
 The argument is that „macroeconomic 
instability and lack of fiscal discipline and appropriate regulatory regimes‟ inhibit the 
efficient and effective provision of services.
71
 Intergovernmental relations should have a 
coordinated and integrated approach to clearly realise the potential of ULG through an 
appropriate legislative framework.
72
 The framework for supervision should balance the need 
for an appropriate regulatory framework enabling environment that respects the autonomy 
and ability of ULG to be an independent decision maker in response to the interest of urban 
communities. 
4.5 Administrative autonomy 
Efficient service provision does not only require democratic institutions, devolved fiscal 
powers, supervision by higher levels of government and clearly defined and legally protected. 
It also requires ULG to have administrative autonomy. ULGs should have the powers to hire 
and dismiss employees without interference from higher levels of government.
73
 ULG should 
have the powers to determine internal processes of implementing policies.
74
 The autonomy of 
ULG to recruit local personnel renders local personnel responsive and accountable to the 
elected officials.
75
 This means that local employees will implement local policies in a way 
that enhances efficient and effective provision of services. An appropriate regulatory 
framework should provide ULG with authority to recruit local personnel without interference 
from higher levels of government. 
5. Conclusion 
The chapter identified ULG as lower level units whose geographical demarcation 
encompasses urban areas. The functions of ULG are not uniform; rather, they differ from one 
country to the other. In most countries services provided by ULG in urban areas include 
water supply, health and sanitation. The chapter also identified five institutional elements for 
effective and efficient ULG from the literature on ULG namely: democratically instituted 
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decision making bodies, administrative autonomy, well-defined and legally protected powers, 
fiscal generating powers and appropriate supervision of ULG by higher levels of government. 
While the implementation of these elements will differ from country to country, they are 
widely regarded as the institutional core for urban local accountability and service delivery. 
First, the role of ULG should be clearly defined and distinguished from higher levels of 
government in appropriate legislative regulatory frameworks. Legislative clarity enables 
ULG to realise its operational framework and improve on its effectiveness and efficiency. 
Secondly, democratically elected institutions legitimise ULG‟s right to independent action 
and provide the basis for urban local accountability. The right to self-determination improves 
the capacity of ULG in decisional-making and enhances service provision. Thirdly, devolved 
fiscal powers are an essential element that provides ULG with fiscal autonomy and 
independence in funding its service provision. Fourthly, ULG should have the autonomy to 
employ local administration for efficiency in the implementation of ULG functions. Finally, 
higher level governmental regulation is an important element for uniformity across all ULG 
institutions as well as preserving national common market against economic forces including 
high inflation, overvalued currency or fiscal deficit.  The next Chapter examines the 
legislative framework for ULG in Zimbabwe: the UC Act.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE URBAN COUNCILS ACT AND URBAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN 
ZIMBABWE 
1. Introduction 
Local government in Zimbabwe has evolved over a long period of time. Urban local 
government is the product of pre-independence and post-independence reforms which have 
changed the centre-local relationship.
76
 This chapter briefly traces the historical evolution of 
urban local government and describes the current institutional structure, focusing on the 
powers and functions of the UCs, supervision, limited revenue-raising powers of UCs to 
extract revenue and the limited powers to appoint administration personnel.  
2. A brief historical perspective of urban local government development (1890-1980) 
ULG in Zimbabwe started with the creation of a sanitary board by the white settlers when 
they occupied Mashonaland and named it Salisbury (now Harare) in 1890. The growth in 
population in Harare caused, amongst other things, a sanitation crisis that threatened the early 
town. A sanitary board was established in Salisbury in 1891.
77
 Yoshikuni describes the board 
as „feeble and incompetent‟.78 In 1893 it only provided for the barest sanitary services for the 
town resulting in charges of „open neglect of more or less every municipal sanitary 
regulation‟.79 The need to provide for sanitation, other basic services and local administration 
in towns and cities drove the evolution of ULG in Zimbabwe.80 
 
It was only until 1898 that the sanitary board was accorded revenue raising powers.
81
 The 
sanitary board‟s borrowing powers were the preserve of central government.82 In order to 
improve the provision of services, government created more town management boards in 
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African townships, whose functions were funded and directed by central government.
83
 At 
that time, most UCs had limited revenue raising powers and therefore had difficulties in 
satisfactorily meeting the growing demand for urban service provision.
84
 Service delivery in 
settler dominated areas was thriving while service provision in African townships was 
inefficient and ineffective. In the urban areas the principle of separate development was 
adhered to, and took the form of separate institutions catering exclusively for the interests of 
the different races.
85
 Service provision for the different races was funded from distinct 
accounts.
86
 The argument is that such a discriminatory approach in the system of ULG was to 
be found in the legislative frameworks. 
Closely linked to the concept of local government was colonial government control.
87
 UCs 
were subservient to the colonial government, and subject to a hierarchical central government 
control.
88
 The existence of central control is also present in the current ULG structure. 
Central control in the existing system of ULG gives a high moral purpose to an „authoritarian 
and paternalistic‟ form of government of which is blamed on the historical developments of 
local government in Zimbabwe.
89
 Centralisation of powers at independence was justified on 
the grounds that the pursuit for nation building and development necessitated central 
direction and national unity. This chapter argues that the current developments in ULG 
necessitate the transfer of decision-making powers and management of local affairs to sub-
national entities to improve service delivery.
90
 There is a general realisation that „local 
governments also are more likely than higher-level governments to provide the right services, 
but also are more likely to provide these services in the right way‟.91 
At independence, it was „clear to many nationalists during the colonial rule that gaining 
control of and changing the institutions, policies and procedures of local government was an 
essential step‟ that motivated transforming local government after independence.92 In 1980, 
in order to create a non-racial local government, which provided for effective and efficient 
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services to all races, the UC Act reorganized the local government system. This resulted in 
the assimilation of local government areas into municipal areas and the inclusion of African 
Townships into already established councils. The argument is that UCs continue to be 
insensitive to urban needs and the provision of effective and efficient services as there is 
intermittent provision of services in most UCs. 
3. The structure of urban local government 
The UC Act provides the current structure of urban local authorities in Zimbabwe. The Act 
outlines the basic organization, powers and functions of urban councils in Zimbabwe. There 
are four categories of urban councils that constitute urban areas. Urban areas are categorized 
as city councils, municipalities, town councils or local boards, subject to urban density and 
development.
93
 Presently there are within urban areas seven cities, nine municipalities, 12 
(twelve) towns and four local boards.  The powers and functions of city, municipality, town 
councils or local boards are derived from and restricted by central government through the 
UC Act. First, UCs perform only those functions which are expressly conferred upon them by 
the minister through the UC Act.
94
  Finally, the minister may also through ministerial 
directives or statutory instruments confer functions upon individual UCs.
95
 For instance while 
city councils and municipalities have been given the power to lease and sell land,
96
 town 
councils and local boards‟ land belongs to the state. 97 A responsible state land department 
within the ministry for local government handles land request for town councils and local 
boards. The UC Act also provides UCs with among other things; making and upholding of 
by-laws, generation and collection of revenues and the provision of services. The legislative 
framework in areas such as service provision, budget process, revenue-raising duty, and 
central regulation provides the operational framework of UCs in Zimbabwe. 
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4. General Powers of UCs 
4.1 Competencies of UCs in relation to service delivery 
 
The literature on ULG illustrated that powers of ULG vary from one country to another. In 
the context of ULG in Zimbabwe, UCs exercise delegated authority to provide services 
within their jurisdiction. Delegated powers are purposely defined functions transferred from 
higher levels to subordinate levels of government.
98
 In the exercise of delegated powers, De 
Visser argues that „central government wields indirect control over the delegated power 
and...Central government is generally empowered to withdraw the delegation.‟99 The 
delegated powers exercised by UCs set the parameters of their operational framework 
provided in the UC Act and determined by central government. Diverse functions are listed in 
sections 157-205 and schedule two to the UC Act.
100
 The UC Act confers discretionary 
powers on UCs to provide basic services such as water, sanitation, health, education, effluent 
and refuse removal.
101
 The minister is empowered to authorise a council to carry out or carry 
on any function whether or not that function is an extension of any power set out in the 
schedule two or any other provision in the UC Act.
102
 
The functions performed by UCs can be categorised into three distinct groups. The first group 
of functions are obligatory functions linked with „health and the maintenance of a healthy 
environment‟.103  UCs are compelled to perform obligatory functions.104 The public is obliged 
to pay for the use of obligatory services including water supply, waste management and 
health facilities. The second group consists of optional functions that make life endurable, 
urban residents have an option not to make use of optional functions.
105
 These can be services 
such as public transport, parking facilities or ambulances. The third group of services offered 
by UCs is referred to as amenities and includes services such as „passive open areas, parks, or 
beer gardens‟.106 
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4.2 Powers of a council to make by-laws 
 
The UC Act gives urban councils powers to make by-laws within their areas of functional 
jurisdiction.
107
 UCs should follow procedures laid down by the central government, which 
must approve a by-law before it can come into force.
108
 The minister may approve the 
proposed by-law or withhold his approval.
109
 Schedule three to the Act provides that UCs can 
make by laws in the following areas: controls of property, sewerage, effluent, and removal of 
refuse and vegetation, food, food premises or vehicles and markets, nuisances, inspections, 
fees, electricity, roads, public places and traffic, water, amenities and facilities, control of any 
service, institution or thing, control of collections, offences and penalties, functions, 
performances, events and amusements, occupational trade and other activities, proceeding of 
council and financial matters including general matters. The minister may also make model 
by-laws providing for any purposes for which a council may make by-laws.
110
 The minister 
may at any time withdraw or amend any model by-laws so made.
111
 
 
By-laws usually address or aid a council to implement its specific operations of UCs such as 
the provision of services or budget formulation. By-laws can also criminalise certain acts 
such as noise nuisances. Other by-laws necessitate conformity with „technical values, and or 
the purchase by the public of an authority permit or licence from the council‟.112 This 
category requires the holder either to have a permit or licence such as vehicle, shop or dog 
licences. Regulatory services form a major part of the operation of a municipality, and a 
council in terms of its by-laws regulates the conduct of its affairs subject to relevant 
legislation. 
5. Revenue raising powers 
Chapter two has emphasised the importance of devolved fiscal generating powers to realise 
the provision of services. The UC Act provides UCs with revenue raising powers. The UC 
Act does not give UCs devolved fiscal powers. UCs thus have limited revenue raising 
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powers. For example UCs can levy only those taxes or borrow such loans as permitted by the 
minister. UCs have limited local taxing, borrowing powers or access to intergovernmental 
transfers and to approve its budget and other fees as may be necessarily to meet its 
expenditure subject to the approval of the minister. These limited sources of revenue subject 
to the approval of the minister are  local taxes and tariffs, borrowing and intergovernmental 
transfers.   
5.1 Revenue generated from local taxing and tariffs 
UCs‟ revenue extracted through local taxing and tariffs can be extracted from levy charges 
for various competencies. These competencies can range from property rating, service 
delivery charges from water supply, refuse and sewage disposal or health services, fees 
charged against users of council amenities encompassing services like flea markets or 
cemeteries, penalties and fines against breach of council by-laws, licence fees, supplementary 
charges or revenue generating income projects for example breweries or beer halls.
113
 These 
are sources of local taxing revenue. For instance revenue can be raised from the sale or lease 
of land, which is passed subject to council resolution made by the majority of the total 
membership of the council at a meeting and approved by the minister.
114
 Property rates or 
taxes also provide councils with a source of own revenue.
115
 The UC Act exempts property 
owned by the state, council or government buildings.
116
 The minister may in terms of the UC 
Act also fix and impose a supplementary charge in respect of immovable property to recover 
any expenses incurred in the maintenance and administration of any area.
117
 
A council may, by majority resolution, fix tariffs or charges for such services as the supply of 
electricity or water or of refuse removal services; or the conveyance of sewage or trade 
effluent in public sewers and its treatment at a sewage treatment works; charges to be payable 
in respect of certificates, licences or permits issued, inspections carried out, services rendered 
or any act, matter or thing done by the council in terms of the UC Act or any other services 
which a council may provide in terms of the Act.
118
 A council resolution to levy tariffs or 
charges for residential accommodation through a by-law
119
 and must be approved by the 
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minister. The minister may in terms of the UC Act also fix the charges against any services or 
facilities for certain premises or residential area.
120
 
5.2 Borrowing powers of UCs 
Borrowing is another source of revenue available to UCs. UCs are subject to the procedure 
set in the UC Act permitted to borrow with the approval of the minister.
121 
Borrowing 
facilitates the ability of urban councils to supplement own generated revenue through local 
taxing. The UC Act therefore permits councils to borrow for specified purposes subject to 
approval by the Minister.
122
 UCs may only borrow for the acquisition of immovable property, 
or construction of permanent works or undertakings, payment of compensation or relief of 
general distress occasioned by some calamity of any previous loan.
123
 The council must give 
public notice stating the general purpose for borrowing the money, amount or any 
information necessary for ratepayers and make an application to the minister for permission 
to borrow the money.
124
 A council may borrow from the state, local authorities‟ pension fund, 
a municipal provident fund, a municipal medical aid society or local authority.
125
 A council 
may also take bonds, debentures or bills subject to the approval of the minister and the 
minister of finance. Further with the approval of the minister a council may engage in any 
commercial, industrial, agricultural or other activity for the purpose of raising revenue
126
 or 
the ability to invest in specified investment funds.
127
  
5.3 Intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
The UC Act or any other legislative framework does not provide for vertical financial 
equalisation of resources to UCs. Vertical financial equalisation entails the sharing of 
resources generated nationally between central and local governments. These grants enable 
UCs to supplement own local taxing and borrowing sources in order to deliver on their 
functions. UCs are assumed to access central government transfers under the Public Sector 
Investment Programme and grants for public health.
128
 The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in 
2005 also created funding through its quasi-fiscal operations to assist the delivery of services 
                                                          
120
 s 235 (3) (q) of UC Act. 
121
 s 290 of UC Act read with s 234 (1) (g) of UC Act. 
122
 s 290 (1) (c) of UC Act. 
123
 s 290 (1) (a)-(g) of UC Act. 
124
 s 290 (3) of UC Act. 
125
 s 290 (5) of UC Act. 
126
 s 221(1) of UC Act. 
127
 s 302 of UC Act. 
128
 Mushamba S A policy dialogue (2010) 111. 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
in UCs.
129
 Central government transfers are meant either to cover delegated functions from 
the centre for example road maintenance or compliment the resources of UCs for enhanced 
provision of services.  
5.4 Budget making process of UCs 
The allocation of resources amongst many competing demands within an urban local 
authority is done through an annual budget.
130
 While urban councils are expected to make a 
large number of policy decisions, one of the most vital is policy determination on the 
adoption of council budgets. A budget allows relative emphasis among different programs 
and services carried within a local area and apportion the residents‟ resources to carry them 
out. A council budget serves as a guide to the local authority in estimating its needs and 
planning to raise the necessary funds to meet service provision. Before the expiry of any 
financial year, the finance committee of a council is obliged to draw up and present for the 
approval of the council, estimates in such detail as the council may require of the income and 
expenditure on revenue and capital accounts
131
 of the council for the next succeeding 
financial year. The council budget comprises of „revenue estimates for the ensuing year, the 
capital estimates for the ensuing year and the capital development plan for the succeeding 
three years‟.132 Copies of the estimates must be made available for inspection by the public 
forthwith.
133
 A council shall not expend any moneys unless such expenditure has been 
approved in the budget or in a supplementary budget.
134
  
6. Central regulation of UCs 
The minister plays a significant role in the operations and functions of the council. The 
minister among other powers approves council operations sets policies and gives directions 
on various matters affecting urban councils. Below is a summation of the powers of the 
minister in relation to the operations of UCs.  
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The powers that the Minister has over UCs envisaged in the UC Act: 
Section Power exercised 
s 4 (4) (b) Minister has powers to authorize the council to suspend the operation of all or any of 
its by-laws within the whole or part of the local authority is being included within the 
council area or a separate council is being established for that area 
s 4A Power to appoint special interest councillors. Special interest councillors also hold 
office at the pleasure of the minister. He can by statutory instrument fix the number of 
the interest councillors. 
s 7 (1)- (3) The minister may by statutory instrument vest administration, control and 
management of local government area and the services provided by the state in a 
council or person. The minister has powers in respect thereof to give directions or 
impose conditions relating to the administration, control and management including 
the provision of services. 
s 80 (1)-(3) & (5) In the event that there are no elected councillors or have been suspended, imprisoned 
or otherwise, the minister has powers to appoint a caretaker to act as council and give 
directions on how the caretaker operates, and holds office at the pleasure of the 
minister (known as the appointed commission). 
s 84 (1) Determines and fixes the first date, place on which a council may hold its first 
meeting. 
s 91 (1)-(2) Unrestrictive access to all councils records, minutes and documentation under the care 
of a council relating to council meetings, resolutions and affairs 
s 104 (3) Appoint a councillor to act as an acting mayor or chairperson in the event of a vacant 
in the respective office and where such council has failed to appoint one. 
s 112 (1) Approves councillors‟ allowances 
s 113 (1)-(3) May approve, vary or withdraw any authority for a council to pay pensions to 
councillors or ex-councillors where special circumstances warranty a council to do so. 
s 114 (1)-(3) Have powers to suspend councillors or revoke suspension. 
s 116 (2)-(5), s 117 (1), 
s 118 &s 120 
Appoint a local government board, chairperson and vice-chair of the board, fix the 
terms and conditions and period of office for the LGB, fix their allowances, and 
remove a member from office. 
s 124 & s 125 & s 129 Minister may give to the LGB directions as to the policy to be observed in the 
exercise of its functions. The LGB has to consult with the minister on the appointment 
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of LGB staff, and by-laws made by the LGB are subject to the approval of the 
minister. 
s 151 (2)-(3) Council cannot expropriate land without minister approval; the minister may refuse 
approval or approval subject to conditions he may think fit. 
s 198 The minister may delegate any function which in his opinion is necessary for a 
council to carry out or carry on whether or not the function is an extension of any 
power set out in the second schedule or in any provision of the UC Act. 
s 206 (2) Power to act on behalf of a council regarding estate development and to expropriate 
land in respect thereof in the name of the council. 
s 210 (5), s 211 (3)  Make regulations to enable procurement board to discharge its functions, prescribe 
different amounts for different classes of councils relating to tender processes. 
s 219 (1) (a) proviso 
(a), (b) 
Minister approves levies in respect of residential accommodation or services provided 
specifically to or in connection with any residential accommodation, further a council 
needs approval of the minister fix in any lease or agreement entered by it levies 
payable by the lessee. 
s 224 (5) & s 225 (1) Approves joint committees initiated by a council and any other local authority. Also 
the minister may also make an order combining local authorities where it appears 
necessary to him. 
s 228 (3) , s 229 (1) & 
s 233 
Approves council by-laws including by-laws made in respect of charges, fees, etc s 
219 proviso (a), can also make or adopt by laws on or behalf of a council,  
s 234 (1)-(2) Minister makes general regulations varying from conduct of elections for mayors, 
councillors or members of local boards, qualification, allowances for members of 
local board, procedures to be followed at meeting relating to councillors, preparation, 
expenditure and information to be set out in a budget, procedure to be followed in 
applying for borrowing powers by a council, and in respect of all matters for which he 
considers it necessary or expedient in terms of the Act. 
s 235 (2), (3) The minister may make such regulations as he considers necessary or desirable for the 
control, management and good government of a local government area. For example 
in ss (3) (q) and (r)  the minister may fix the charges against any services, amenities or 
facilities provided by the state either for certain premises or residents; fix or impose in 
respect of immovable property a supplementary charge to cover the expenses incurred 
by the state in the maintenance and administration of the area. 
 s 241 (2), (4) (a), s Minister appoints the valuation board that assess and values property for rating. One 
of the members is directly selected by him, member selected by the minister shall hold 
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242 (1) (a) & (2) (a) office at his pleasure, and has powers to terminate office of appointed members. 
s 290 (2) (c) Minister approves borrowing powers of council. 
s 304 (1) The minister approves person/persons to be appointed as financial auditors by council  
s 309 May require a council to furnish records of its proceedings and other documents or 
information he considers necessary. 
s 313 Minister may give directions on matters of policy a council is to observe in the 
exercise of its functions. 
s 314 (1) May reverse, suspend, and rescind resolutions, decisions or action of councils. 
 
These identified provisions that provide the powers exercised by the minister in practice are 
arbitrarily employed by the minister to undermine the competency of UCs as the study will 
show.
135
  
7. Centralised control of local senior personnel recruitment 
The minister appoints a seven-member board to constitute the local government board.
136
 The 
chair and vice-chair of the board are appointed by the minister from amongst the appointed 
members.
137
 The board is responsible for the recruitment and discharge of senior officials of 
the council
138
 to ensure the general well-being and good administration of council‟s staff and 
the maintenance of  a high state of efficiency
139
 as well as to conduct inquiries into the affairs 
and procedure of senior officials.
140
 Further, the LGB has powers to make regulations 
stipulating the qualifications and procedures for senior officials of councils and to provide 
guidance for the general organisation and control of employees in the service of councils.
141
 
The day-to-day administration and the implementation of UCs‟ policies is realised by salaried 
personnel. Senior council personnel are recruited by the LGB. The person recruited by the 
LGB shall be appointed as either the town clerk
142
 or secretary of the council.
143 
The town 
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clerk heads the executive arm of the council and is responsible for the proper administration 
and managing of operations of the local authority.
144
  
The employment of other officials other than senior officials is left to the council.
145
 
However, the appointment made in respect of a municipal council is on the recommendation 
of the town clerk
146
 or secretary if it is a town council.
147
 Salaries of permanent employees of 
council are met from revenue, unless the Minister has directed that the salaries are provided 
from capital or loan account.
148
 
8. Conclusion 
This chapter provided a brief history of urban local government in Zimbabwe from 1890 to 
1980. It spelt out that UCs have since time immemorial been creatures of statute, and 
subservient to central government. The powers to provide for services and generate revenue 
have been subject to central government approval. The challenges of poor service delivery 
faced by present day ULG have been in existence since the colonial era.  
The provisions in the UC Act which provide for the structure, powers, finances and staffing 
matters of UCs were identified. The powers of UCs are not constitutionally guaranteed, the 
exercise of their powers are dependent on central government. Secondly, the chapter focussed 
on the powers to extract revenue by UCs and budget making process. The powers are limited 
and subject to central government approval. Lastly, the research made reference to central 
regulation and the appointment of UCs‟ administration. The central theme in the discussion is 
the over-arching powers of the minister and lack of protection of the powers of UCs. The 
next chapter examines specific weaknesses in the UC Act and how these weaknesses 
negatively impact the provision of services. Chapter four focuses on the inadequacies in the 
UC Act that relate to central regulation of UCs, powers of UCs and the central interference in 
the appointment of UCs staff that inhibit the effective and efficient delivery of service. The 
analysis will draw from international best practises set out in chapter two.  
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                                                     CHAPTER FOUR 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE WEAKNESSES IN THE URBAN COUNCILS ACT THAT 
IMPEDE SERVICE DELIVERY 
1. Introduction 
The services that UCs in Zimbabwe provide to urban residents must enhance their quality of 
life and contribute to urban development.
149
 The literature on ULG illustrated the importance 
attached to effective and efficient provision of urban services. A key lesson from the 
literature is that supervision by higher levels of government, democracy, administrative 
autonomy, legislative certainty about the powers and fiscal health of ULG is essential for 
effective and efficient service provision. This chapter analyses the specific weaknesses in the 
UC Act namely: limited revenue generating powers, unfettered powers of the minister, lack 
of legal protection of powers, and centralised control over the recruitment of senior 
personnel. In analysing the weaknesses in the UC Act, the chapter makes use of essential 
elements for effective and efficient service delivery provided in chapter two.  
2. Powers and Functions of UCs 
2.1 Lack of legal protection for UCs’ service delivery role 
 The UC Act does not conform to standards for legal certainty about powers and functions in 
the international literature discussed in Chapter two. First, UCs exercise delegated powers 
and do not have original powers, which reside with central government. Central government 
determines which powers and functions UCs will perform. This establishes a relationship of 
principal and an agent. The exercise of delegated powers has compromised the capacity of 
UCs to deliver services both efficiently and effectively. The argument is that the final 
decision over the provision of a particular service should lie with the level of government that 
can cover the cost of the provision of the service.
150
 Secondly, the provision of services by 
UCs is generally poor and one of the causes is that efficient and effective provision of 
services is undermined by a high level of central interference in the decisions of UCs. For 
instance, in 2005, the minister issued a directive which revoked water  management functions 
from UCs and transferred its management  to the Zimbabwe National Water Authority 
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(hereafter ZINWA).
151
 Arguably, the transfer of water to ZINWA without the necessary 
accountability mechanisms has led to regressed patterns in the provision of water supply and 
sanitation in urban areas. The transfer of the UCs‟ function to provide water also deprived 
UCs of local taxing sources of revenue thereby constraining their already weak revenue 
bases. This compromised their financial capacities to generate revenue to fund the provision 
of other services. In 2008, the minister issued another directive handing water provision back 
to councils.
152
 This illustrates the extent of instability caused by central interference in local 
government functions and the negative impact on service delivery.  
The UC Act provides electricity as a competence of UCs. The generation and distribution of 
electricity was revoked in 1989 from UCs by central government.
153
 The generation and 
supply of electricity is under the authority of Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority. This 
removed a potential revenue generating base from UCs. The law subjects UCs to the vagaries 
and prejudices of central government. Central government gives and takes powers from UCs 
as it chooses. The lack of protection afforded to UCs by the UC Act has resulted in an 
undermining of their revenue bases. Also the lack of constitutional protection undermines 
their sense of ownership of the functions they must perform, contributing to poor service 
delivery. The system is also wasteful and in some instances causes over concentration of 
resources on one service at the expense of other basic services. 
2.2 Limited powers to make by-laws 
The making of by-laws is another area where local authorities have been frustrated by central 
government. Council resolutions in respect of schedule three matters or any incidental matter 
thereof have authority only when approved.
154
 The by-law has to be approved by the 
minister.
155
 The law gives the minister the discretion either to approve or disapprove the by-
law.
156
 The discretion given to the minister potentially compromises the functions of UCs, 
because by-laws can only take effect after approval by the minister.
157
  The fact that a by-law 
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has no force unless it gains the approval of the minister underlines the extent of control that 
the minister exercises over UCs in matters of decision making.  
The power given to the minister in the UC Act undermines the power to make by-laws of 
UCs.
158
 For instance, a council might respond to public demands for a service delivery 
implementation strategy by enacting a by-law, but the by-law is subjugated to central control 
and cannot be implemented unless it has been approved by the minister. A council thus finds 
itself „tied down by procedures in their decision making...even for routine decisions‟.159 A 
council owes its accountability to the urban citizens, so the decision of matters in the 
schedule three should lie with the end user and not the minister. A thriving ULG requires 
citizens to set the overall agenda on service provision.
160
 The design of the UC Act 
compromises also the efficiency of UCs in the event that the minister fails to approve 
timeously or he disapproves the by-law. Unless and until the by-law has been approved there 
is nothing that UCs can do in respect of schedule three or any incidental matters thereto.  
3. Limited fiscal generating powers 
The purpose of making UCs‟ powers to generate revenue subject to ministerial approval is to 
protect urban residents against market forces and macro-economic instability including high 
inflation. This power has been arbitrarily used to constrain the capacity of UCs to generate 
revenue without interference by central government. It is clear from the literature on the 
subject that revenue-raising powers are essential for effective and efficient provision of urban 
services. For ULG to be able to meet its primary purpose of service provision there should be 
a genuine devolution and sufficient fiscal powers. The chapter argues that design of the UC 
Act seriously constrains the capacity of ULG to generate resources that guarantee predictable 
service provision because the powers bestowed upon the minister inhibit the fiscal 
independence of urban local authorities. The argument is that the design of the legal 
framework impacts the extent to which ULG can generate revenue. Scholars such as Shah 
argue that „laws typically limit both the kinds of revenues that local governments can raise 
and different revenue types‟.161 According to Marumahoko fiscal autonomy is essential for 
effective and efficient provision of services:  
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„Central government control on the usage of finances weakens the expenditure discretion of urban 
councils. The financial controls go to the core of the autonomy of urban local authorities and create a 
situation where the ability of urban councils to fulfil their mandates is paralysed‟.162 
In the context of ULG in Zimbabwe, UCs can only levy those charges or taxes as permitted 
by the minister under the UC Act. The section points out that the design of the UC Act limits 
the capacity of UCs to raise taxes or tariffs, UCs can only raise for example property taxes, 
charges or borrow within limits set by the minister. For instance an urban council will require 
the approval of the minister to implement its funding arrangements on tariffs, borrowing, and 
expropriation of land or entering into any fiscal agreement that benefits the council.
163
 As a 
result, UCs cannot autonomously exercise their fiscal powers. 
 
The UC Act also does not provide urban councils with reliable systems for debt collection for 
the provision of services such as water supply, refuse and effluent removal or prescribe the 
process to be employed in debt collection. There is continued recurring failure by UCs to 
extract or enforce the urban populace to remit fees or charges for services provided such as 
water supply, rates and waste management. Consequently, councils lose out on revenue. For 
instance, at the time of writing the city of Harare is owed US$273 million from government 
departments, private sector, and residents alone contributing close to US$40 million of the 
total cost from unpaid water bills, rates and supplementary charges.
164
 Urban residents argue 
that until UCs provide satisfactory services they are not going to pay for erratic services. UCs 
also lose revenue because they lack the capacity and mechanisms to trace debtors. The effect 
is that revenue declines, compromising services and facilities. For example,  urban residents 
become susceptible to diseases such as typhoid and cholera because intermittent supply of 
water causes residents to make use of unprotected water sources which are sometimes 
exposed to the discharge of raw sewage, such as the Mukuvisi river in Harare.
165
 
The minister also has powers to set the policy framework that determines tariffs and 
residential rates. In some instances, the policies made by the minister concern matters of 
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general application across all UCs, with relatively few opportunities for individual councils to 
extract revenue in accordance with their individual expenditure. For instance in 2008, the 
ministry imposed tariffs and rates without consulting UCs.
166
 The failure to generate revenue 
that is inter alia with council expenditure limits the capacity of UCs to provide for services on 
a continued basis. The section argues that these over-arching powers of the minister are 
protected by the UC Act, and are not alive to the realities of UCs purpose and challenges and 
constrains service provision.
167
  
Limited sources of own revenue compromise  service provision by UCs resulting in waste left 
uncollected in the streets, blocking drainage channels or dumped in water courses, persistent 
water cuts or prolonged periods without water, pot-holed roads, and dysfunctional primary 
health centres.
168
 Limited resources have not only compromised the independence of UCs, 
but have subjected them to central government control. It has „created a situation in which 
urban councils increasingly look to central government to bail them out financially, 
strengthening the perception that central government is a superior order of government‟.169 
3.1 Partial borrowing powers 
The literature on ULG shows that borrowing is another important source of revenue for UCs. 
UCs may borrow but subject to the approval of the minister. The minister is empowered to 
approve
170
 and cancel the borrowing powers of a council.
171
 The UC Act does not protect 
UCs since the decision of the minister is final. The section argues that the minister uses 
powers in the UC Act to compromise and subjugate UCs‟ reasonable access to other sources 
of revenue. The argument is that central government stifles borrowing powers especially in 
those UCs whose political views differ from the minister. This compromises service delivery, 
UCs possesses inadequate fiscal generating resources. UCs should be able to supplement 
local taxing revenue for efficient and enhanced service delivery through borrowing. Majority 
of these UCs are performing dismally as a result of insufficient fiscal resources.  
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3.2 Lack of legislative framework to regulate central government grants 
In many jurisdictions grants from higher level government are an important source for the 
equitable „local service provision and fiscal health‟ of ULG.172 In the context of Zimbabwe‟s 
ULG, neither the UC Act nor any other Act provides the legislative framework for a system 
of intergovernmental grants. The failure by the UC Act to expressly provide for 
intergovernmental transfers to UCs exposes the whole process to manipulation. In Zimbabwe, 
grants given to UCs are in most cases conditional grants for specific activities.
173
 For instance 
grants are given to UCs to remunerate employees in health and education services or in some 
instances in times of emergency.
174
 Central grants are channelled to UCs through the Public 
Sector Investment Programme. UCs also have limited discretion on the use and access of 
grants. The use of grants depends on conditions attached to the grant and the limitations on 
their use. The chapter argues that in ULG, central transfers in UCs are not distributed on the 
basis of the principle of equity, which distributes financial resources based on the capacity of 
individual UCs to generate revenue.  Instead, grants are often distributed on the basis of 
political patronage, making UCs susceptible to the vagaries and prejudices of the national 
government. The section argues that absence of a system of transfers that takes account of the 
differing costs and needs of different areas negatively impacts the provision of services in 
UCs.    
Central government grants are necessary to fund those functions that were originally central 
functions but subsequently delegated to UCs for efficiency purposes.  UCs are forced within 
the limited resources to cater for delegated functions without central provision of additional 
revenue. While international literature provides that „finance must follow function‟ in most 
UCs, central government has „been assigning new responsibilities...including education and 
health, without providing sufficient additional resources‟.175 For UCs to be fiscally healthy, 
they should have reliable and sufficient revenue sources. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
are crucial for efficiency and the equitable distribution of services amongst UCs. The 
argument is that lack of an express regulatory framework that sets the allocation procedure of 
grants renders the process of intergovernmental transfer unpredictable.  As a result, UCs are 
imbued with functions they cannot deliver because of fiscal inefficiency and inequity. The 
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expenditure demands of UCs are not proportionate to the fiscal sources they generate. The 
argument is that the failure to provide for a legislative framework that guarantees the 
predictable flow of intergovernmental transfers compromises the ability of UCs to efficiently 
and effectively provide for services. UCs are forced to distribute insufficient limited revenue 
amongst the services they provide to accommodate central delegated functions.   
3.3 Centrally restricted budget making process 
A budget is a prerequisite for council expenditure for each year. The budget sets out a 
council‟s priorities and reflects the allocation of scarce resource among the service the 
council intends to provide. Central government determines the UCs budget guidelines 
showing the procedure of budget formulations in line with the Standardised Accounting 
Budgeting System, Procedures and Policies Manuals.
176
 Central dominance constrains the 
independence of urban local government to spend revenue: 
„The budgeting and planning processes for urban local government reflect a fundamental dependence 
on and control by central government. The budgets of urban councils are subject to a regulatory 
framework set by central government, watering down the authority of urban councils to structure their 
budgets to meet local preferences‟.
177
  
Central interference has fiscal and monetary policy implications on UCs expenditure 
programmes and inhibits the processes that UCs should use to expedite the provision of 
services. Central government is too geographically and operationally detached to appreciate 
UCs expenditure that is in line with urban local preferences. UCs are best placed to determine 
how best to formulate its budgets. 
 
As a result, more time is spent on budget processes going back and forth between council and 
central government impacting on the quality of services provided.  For instance the budget 
for the city of Kwekwe had not been approved by May 2011.
178
 This impinges on the 
financial plans of a council and hinders the provision of service to the public at large. UCs 
cannot do anything meaningful without a running budget; it impacts the delivery of services. 
The effect is that the service delivery becomes retarded, ineffective and inefficient.  
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4. Centralised control over senior administration recruitment 
The literature on ULG highlights the power of UCs to choose their own „staff is an essential 
ingredient for effective and efficient service delivery‟.179 This is quite important in a 
centralised system that urban councils operate under, because council resolutions are 
implemented by salaried staff. The LGB approves the appointment of senior staff as indicated 
in chapter three. Since the LGB is a structure that is influenced by the minister, experience 
shows that „higher-level...administrative appointments created a hierarchical structure...that 
made local governments more responsive to central...government demands than they were to 
the needs of local constituents‟.180 Central government links in the appointment of senior 
personnel dilutes the independence of UCs when it comes to the council‟s employment 
choice of Senior Officers. Senior council officials encompass posts like that of the Town 
Clerk, Chamber Secretary, Director of Health, Engineer, Treasurer and all heads of 
departments and their deputies.
181
 The UC Act extends the role of the LGB to the general 
control of council workforce. The paper argues that most senior officials are appointed on 
political partisanship; this compromises the loyalty of staff. For example the town clerk of 
Harare, Mutare, Chegutu, Chitungwiza and Kwekwe identify with the minister‟s political 
party. In most cases the appointments are not based on competency but partisanship and 
therefore impacts on the quality of services provided to the urban communities.  
The appointment of council personnel by central government „impedes the responsiveness of 
local entities...it is apparent that local level responsiveness is enhanced where...administrators 
are appointed locally‟.182 The mayor of Harare has repeatedly accused the Harare council 
administration of deliberately not implementing council resolutions thereby shrinking and 
blocking municipal services in a bid just to discredit his administration in the eyes of the 
public. The present mayor for Harare, Muchadeyi Masunda has publicly condemned the 
political loyalty of council administration on numerous occasions and stated that:  
„The threat to service delivery is mind-boggling lethargy on the part of the functionaries whose roles 
have been compromised almost beyond redemption because they are torn in between the interests of 
the stakeholders and those of the political parties‟.183  
                                                          
179
 Selznick P TVA and the grassroots: A study in the sociology of formal organisation (1949) 112. 
180
 Andrews M and Shah A (2005) 72. 
181
 s 134 (1) of UC Act.  
182
 Andrews M and Shah A (2005) 72. 
183
 Matenga M „Shape up or ship out‟ (News Day 30 May 2011). 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
The mayor‟s outburst is a reflection of how political patronage can compromise service 
delivery. The influence of central government on staff appointment negatively impacts 
service delivery, in that the agenda of service delivery suffers neglect since the partisan 
officials direct their energies on differences than co-ordinate efforts that move the council to 
be an institution that provides services efficiently and effectively. The argument is that UCs 
should have the autonomy to recruit and dismiss senior officials. The section points out that 
the lack of autonomy in the recruitment of senior staff in most cases causes conflict that often 
exists amongst the town clerk, the mayor and councillors, meaning there is no collaboration 
and to an extent no accountability, affecting the capacity of a council to deliver services 
effectively and efficiently.  
Council personnel are remunerated from council revenue.
184
 The study identified that UCs 
are struggling within the limited fiscal powers to generate adequate revenue to meet their 
expenditures. The paper argues that the failure by UCs to raise adequate revenue also impacts 
its capacity to remunerate council employees lucratively. Council personnel are poorly 
remunerated and lack adequate incentives. This largely has contributed to the exodus of 
skilled and qualified personnel due to poor salaries and state of affairs. Absence of skilled 
and adequate personnel exacerbates the deterioration of delivery of services in UCs
185
   
5. Unfettered powers of the minister 
The supervision of UCs by higher levels of government is an accepted element of effective 
urban government.  Supervision is necessary for uniformity, the realisation of national goals 
and efficient service delivery in the country as a whole. However, the UC Act confers 
unfettered powers on the minister, as discussed in chapter three. The UC Act subjects UCs 
politically, organizationally and fiscally to centralised control. The relationship that exists 
between central and local authorities in Zimbabwe is one between a delegator-delegatee, with 
the central government as the delegator and local UCs as the delegatees. This relationship is 
manifest in the manner in which the UC Act allocates power between the two. Anything 
which is not specifically mentioned is assumed to fall outside urban councils‟ functional 
jurisdiction. Even in those areas, in which they have been empowered to act, central 
government has powers to revoke UCs functions.  Central government exerts stifling and 
inefficient bureaucratic control over many aspects of local authority operations for instance 
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setting of by-laws, service provision functions and fiscal generation. The minister decides 
whether a local board shall be constituted by appointed or elected members and their term of 
office
186
 and suspension and dismissal of elected councillors. There is extensive political 
interference in the internal administration of UCs by the minister.
187
 The section argues that 
the disadvantage lies in that the minister limits the capacity of elected officials, in most cases 
creates conflict. The minister is more concerned with maximising his own self-interests such 
as power and patronage against public interest and service provision. 
The policies which govern urban councils are usually made at the centre by the minister in 
the form of directives or circulars. In most cases, the minister‟s directives or circulars are 
made without consulting UCs despite the impact they have on functions of UCs.
188
 For 
instance, prior to the 2008 harmonised (national) elections
189
 the minister abolished the office 
of the executive mayor. The argument is that abolishing the office of the executive mayor has 
created persistent contestation between the town clerk and mayor in most UCs. Stripping the 
mayor of his/her executive powers took away any meaningful powers to influence the 
provision of service delivery and quality. The design of the UC Act as it relates to 
fundamental features of council imposes constraints, and limits the autonomy of UCs in the 
provision of service.. The constant meddling in the activities of urban councils by the 
minister has brought nothing but poor service delivery and role confusion causing the 
populace to lose faith in the ULG‟s ability to deliver services optimally. 
The chapter argues that the minister is geographically and operationally remote from the local 
people and thus less responsive to the local people‟s immediate needs. The extensive control 
of the minister over UCs cripples the powers of urban councils to provide services effectively 
and efficiently to meet local needs. The section argues that as a result, urban councils are 
caught up more in trying to please or at most fighting the minister at the expense of focusing 
on developmental goals that give the public satisfaction as is evidence in most UCs. The 
section concludes that the UC Act gives the minister over-arching powers. 
5.1 Powers to suspend and dismiss elected officials 
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Chapter two has shown the importance of ULG processes that realises urban local 
democracy. Literature on ULG usually draws a link between democracy and efficient and 
effective provision of services. The literature also attaches importance of democratically 
instituted decision-making bodies for the functioning of ULG.
190
 In the context of 
Zimbabwean ULG, while the majority of councillors are elected, the UC Act gives the 
minister powers to suspend and dismiss elected officials and to appoint special interest 
councillors. The minister has powers to dismiss elected officials. The design of the UC Act 
does not guarantee the powers of the council. In recent years, the power of suspension has 
been used arbitrarily in order to weaken opposition in councils. The Minister is notorious for 
dismissing Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (hereafter MDC-T) mayors and 
councillors. For instance, he dismissed the Bindura mayor for alleged acts of misconduct.
191
 
It has become common since 2003 for the minister to dismiss elected officials in most urban 
councils such as Harare, Mutare, Chitungwiza and Chegutu.
192
 This chapter argues that 
councillors and mayors are protected while in office but only if their policies reflect that of 
central government. What this does is centralising powers and creating institutions which do 
not enhance service delivery.  
5.2 Powers to appoint special interest councillors 
The minister is also empowered to appoint at „his pleasure‟ special interest councillors in 
every municipal and town council not exceeding one –quarter of elected councillors, and 
even though they are entitled to benefits as those of the elected councillors and participate in 
the business of the council they have no veto powers.
193
 As regards veto powers, unless their 
concerns are translated into votes in council meetings, there is no way they can influence 
service delivery. Consequently, the special interest councillors are unaccountable to local 
citizens largely because the decisions mechanisms that facilitate citizen influence are missing 
such as veto powers to influence service delivery.
194
 So any meaningful contribution to 
effective and efficient service delivery is constrained by the fact that they cannot vote in 
council meetings. In addition, concerns have been raised that the minister abuses the 
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institution of special interest councillors. The fact that special interest councillors hold office 
at the pleasure of the Minister compromises their independence, making it likely that they 
will align with his views. For instance, it is alleged that the minister appoints unsuccessful 
councillors at the general election. 
Special interest councillors are meant to provide expertise to the UCs. As newly elected 
councillors come into council without experience so special interest councillors complement 
them in order to enhance service delivery.
195
 On the contrary, the appointment process has 
been succeeded by primacy of patronage, as this has largely served partisan interests.
196
 The 
section points out that appointed councillors will often oppose the decisions of democratically 
elected councillors even when it is not in the interest of the urban populace for them to do so.   
The process for appointing councillors is a violation of citizen representation in decision 
making process because councillors are not democratically elected.
197
 The elected officials 
are involved in the legislative business of UCs, and in practice elected councillors are 
outnumbered and always under the authority of the appointees. There is no criterion for 
controlling the Minister‟s use of the power to appoint special interest councillors. Harare 
lawyer Beatrice Mtetwa said the minister does as he pleases with council.
198
 The appointment 
of special interest councillors is clearly against all „democratic precepts and again causes 
developmental bottlenecks and general disgruntlement as constituents and residents see that 
their leaders of choice dis-empowered‟.199  
6. Conclusion 
The chapter analysed the specific weaknesses in the UC Act namely: unfettered powers of the 
minister, lack of devolved fiscal powers, lack of legally protected and clear powers and lack 
of autonomy to recruit senior personnel of UCs. The argument advanced is that the UC Act 
gives over-arching powers to the minister. The powers exercised by UCs are subject to 
ministerial approval in particular the delivery of service, setting of by-laws, fiscal generating 
powers, and recruitment of senior personnel, suspension and dismissal of councillors. The 
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chapter argued that the design of the UC Act stifles that capacity of UCs to effectively and 
efficiently provide for services and in some instances the minister recentralises powers and 
deprive UCs of fiscal raising resources and functions. The study illustrated that subjecting the 
operational framework of UCs to the vagaries and prejudices of the minister contributes to 
ineffective and inefficient provision of services in urban areas. The next chapter will suggest 
proposals that may address the identified weaknesses in the UC Act. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
UCs provide urban residents with basic services such as water supply, health services and 
waste management. Service delivery in urban areas is characterised by erratic water supply, 
poor waste management, and intermittent health services. The poor state of service delivery 
can be traced to various challenges facing UCs in the performance of their duties. This study 
has focused on one of these challenges, namely the extent to which weaknesses in the UC Act 
contribute to poor service delivery. The study was organised in five chapters. This chapter 
gives a summation of the findings in the study. 
Chapter one gave a background to the study and identified in its statement of problem in 
particular, the unfettered powers of the minister, lack of clear and legally protected powers of 
UCs, limited fiscal powers and lack autonomy in the recruitment of senior officials as causing 
poor service delivery. In chapter two the study explored the available literature on ULG. It 
identified four essential elements recognised amongst international jurisdictions that enhance 
the effective and efficient delivery of services in ULG: democratically constituted 
institutions, administrative autonomy, well-defined and legally protected powers, adequate 
and devolved fiscal capacity and regulation by higher levels of government. These elements 
are universally acknowledged as benchmarks for creating an environment that enhances 
service provision in ULG effectively and efficiently. 
Chapter three provided a brief overview of the historical development of ULG in Zimbabwe. 
Focus of the chapter was to give a description of the legal structure of UCs. The chapter 
focussed mainly on the weaknesses in the UC Act that inhibit the effective and efficient 
provisions of services. The weaknesses in the UC Act linked to poor service delivery centred 
on lack of legal protection and well-defined powers, limited fiscal raising powers, unfettered 
powers of the minister and centralised control over the recruitment of senior UCs personnel.  
Chapter four analysed the specific gaps in the UC Act that relate to central regulation of UCs, 
powers of UCs to provide services, limited powers to generate revenue and the central 
interference in the appointment of UCs staff that inhibit the effective and efficient delivery of 
service. The chapter drew a link between the legislative gaps in the UC Act and their impact 
on the provision of services. The analysis relied on international benchmarks set out in 
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chapter two. The purpose was to see whether the ULG system in Zimbabwe meets the 
universally acclaimed ULG standards. The study shows that ULG in Zimbabwe falls short of 
meeting the universally recognised values: UCs lack sufficient and devolved fiscal powers, 
the powers UCs exercise to generate revenue such as local taxing, borrowing and central 
grants are subject to ministerial approval. The UC Act gives the minister unfettered powers 
over the operational framework of UCs. Again, the study shows that UCs cannot set by-laws, 
provide services or suspend councillors without the consent of the minister. The analysis 
examined that lack of legally protected and well-defined powers centralises the powers 
exercised by UCs. The minister may revoke UCs powers because the powers are exercised on 
a delegator-delegatee relationship. The study has also shown that UCs lack administrative 
autonomy in the recruitment of senior personnel. The lack of administrative autonomy has 
compromised the loyalty of senior employees to UCs.  
The study examined the weaknesses in the UC Act and has shown the negative impact these 
weaknesses have on the efficient and effective provision of services in urban areas. The 
weaknesses include the lack of clear and legally protected powers of UCs, limited revenue 
raising powers, unfettered powers of the minister and centralised control over the recruitment 
of senior staff. These inadequacies impact negatively on the capacity of UCs to provide 
efficient and effective service provision. Of importance to acknowledge is the Constitution 
making process underway in Zimbabwe. It is hoped that it will adequately acknowledge the 
existence of local government as independent sphere of government. Also at the time of 
concluding this research a motion had been adopted in parliament to amend the UC Act. The 
rationale for initiating amendment by the legislature is to curtail the unfettered powers of the 
minister in order to make UCs more effective and efficient. The question then is how can 
these problems be addressed? There are four recommendations: 
First, UCs should have constitutionally protected and well-defined powers. Constitutionally 
protected and well-defined powers are important in order to clarify UCs‟ roles for effective 
and efficient service provision.  
Secondly, the legislative framework should guarantee UCs with sufficient revenue generating 
powers. Central to the continuity and efficient provision of services is the capacity of UCs to 
access adequate fiscal powers for revenue generation. The legislative framework should 
provide for both vertical and horizontal equalisation of revenue.  
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Thirdly, there should be a clear separation of UCs and central roles. Clarity on roles allows 
UCs and central government to know the extent of their powers so as to minimise 
interference in the UCs‟ functions. The role of the minister should assume a regulatory role 
rather than managerial one and the legislative framework should clarify the regulatory scope 
of central government.  
Finally, UCs should have autonomy to recruit senior personnel. Local autonomy over 
personnel recruitment guards against central allegiance by senior personnel. Central role may 
be limited to the regulation of the qualification and salary scales of council‟s employees.  
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